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Litigation of a Sexual Harassment Case
After the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Marian C. Haney
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost thirty years, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964' has prohibited discrimination in employment because of a
person's sex.2 Sexual harassment, as a form of sex discrimination,
was first recognized by a court in 1976.- In 1980, in order to reaf-
firm its long recognized position that sexual harassment is sex
discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") amended its existing Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of Sex4 to add a section dealing expressly with sexual ha-
rassment. In 1986, the United States Supreme Court in Menitor
Savings Bank v. Vinson5 determined that Title VII prohibits sexual
harassment in the employment context even where the harassment
does not result in direct financial harm. Finally, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 (the "Act")6 was passed, which is expected to alter
the course and direction of the litigation of sexual harassment
cases. Only time will reveal just how dramatic these changes will
be.7
* Attorney, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Illinois.
1 Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c). The pro-
hibition against sex discrimination was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor
of the House of Representatives. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
2 Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
3 Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), reuld and remanded on other
grounds sub nom Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
4 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1992).
5 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
6 Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (Supp. mI 1992).
7 Because many courts have determined that the recently passed Act is not to be
given retroactive effect, see infa note 63, at present relatively few cases have actually
been litigated under the 1991 Act.
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II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT-THEORY AND LIABILITY
The EEOC Guidelines are not binding on courts but have
persuasive weight because they are the official view of the EEOC,
the agency charged with the administration of Title VII. In defin-
ing sexual harassment, section 1604.11(a) of the EEOC Guidelines
states:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.8
A. Types of Sexual Harassment
There are essentially two theories of sexual harassment: quid
pro quo and hostile environment.9 The essence of the quid pro
quo theory is that an individual "relies upon his apparent or actu-
al authority to extort sexual consideration from an employee."10
Quid pro quo harassment occurs where "sexual consideration is
demanded in exchange for job benefits."" In 1986, the Supreme
Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. VWnson 2 determined that under
certain conditions sexually harassing conduct can constitute a Title
VII violation even where no tangible job detriment has resulted.
According to the EEOC,14 the line between quid pro quo
and hostile environment harassment is not always clear. For exam-
8 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992).
9 Id. Sections 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) describe quid pro quo harassment, and section
1604.11(a)(3) describes hostile environment harassment. Sex-based harassment may be
construed as another type of harassment. Sex-based harassment may not necessarily in-
volve sexual language or conduct. Rather, it is offensive language or conduct directed at
a person because of his or her sex. The legal standards relating to traditional hostile envi-
ronment harassment are applicable.
10 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (lth Cir. 1982).
11 Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1990).
12 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
13 Id. at 65.
14 See EEOC Policy Guidance on Seuam Harassment, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 645,
at 405:6681 (Mar. 19, 1990).
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pie, an individual's tangible job conditions are affected when a
sexually hostile work environment results in constructive discharge.
Likewise, a supervisor who makes sexual advances toward a subor-
dinate employee may impliedly communicate that a failure to
comply will adversely affect the individual's job status.
The Supreme Court determined that Title VII affords employ-
ees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult."5 The Court held that a plain-
tiff may establish a Title VII violation by showing that the harass-
ment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to change the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.
16
In Meritor, the Supreme Court stated that the gravamen of a
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances are
"unwelcome."17 Thus, that the sex-related conduct was voluntary,
in that the complainant was not forced to participate, is not a
defense to a Title VII sexual harassment suit. The correct inquiry
is whether the victim by her"8 conduct indicated that the alleged
sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual partic-
ipation therein was voluntary. 9
The EEOC Guidelines state that the EEOC, in making a de-
termination whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harass-
ment, "will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the
circumstances."' The legality of a particular action will be deter-
mined "from the facts, on a case by case basis." 1
In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a case decided shortly after
Meritor, the Seventh Circuit defined conduct which did not consti-
tute sexual harassment. In Scott, the issue was whether the alleged
instances of harassment rose to a level of hostility offensive
enough to be considered actionable under Title VII. Scott was
trained to become an automobile mechanic at Sears. A male se-
nior mechanic named Gadberry was assigned to give her on-the-
15 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
16 Id. at 67.
17 Id. at 68.
18 Throughout this Article, for the sake of simplicity, the alleged harassee will be
referred to as a female and the alleged harasser will be referred to as a male. Obviously,
the genders should be reversed where appropriate.
19 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
20 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1992).
21 Id.
22 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
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job training. Scott contended that Gadberry created a hostile envi-
ronment by repeatedly sexually harassing her. She claimed that
Gadberry propositioned her, winked at her, and suggested he give
her a rubdown. She claimed that when she asked for assistance,
Gadberry would often reply, "what will I get for it" 23 Scott also
asserted that another mechanic slapped her on the buttocks and
yet another mechanic told her he knew "she must moan and
groan while having sex."
24
On the other hand, Scott admitted that Gadberry never ex-
pressly asked her to have sex and never touched her. She thought
that he was "basically nice" and considered him a friend.
Gadberry's "propositioning" was nothing more than requests to
take her to a restaurant for drinks after work. Although Gadberry
responded "what will I get for it" when Scott asked for his advice,
there was no evidence that he withheld information due to her
failure to "give something" in return.' There was also no indica-
tion that the other mechanics repeated their alleged offensive
conduct. Significantly, Scott conceded that she never complained
about the above conduct to any supervisory personnel.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the
harassment as described by the plaintiff "was not so severe, debili-
tating or pervasive that it created an actionable hostile environ-
ment claim within the current interpretation of Title VII."26 Sim-
ply put, Scott failed to show that the conduct about which she
complained was so hostile that it affected the terms and condi-
tions of her employment.
27
B. Sexual Favoritism
Often third parties, that is, persons who are injured by gen-
der-based conduct in the workplace that is either directed at some-
one else or at no one in particular, may have valid claims. In
1990, the EEOC addressed sexual favoritism in three situations:
(1) favoritism based upon quid pro quo harassment; (2) isolated
instances of favoritism toward a lover; and (3) environmental ha-
rassment caused by widespread favoritism. 28
23 Id. at 211.
24 Id. at 211-12.
25 Id. at 212.
26 Id. at 213-14.
27 Id. at 214.
28 FEOC. Policy Guide on Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism Under Title V, 8 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 694, at 405:6817 (Jan. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Sexual Favoritism].
[Vol. 68:1037
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The classic third-party case concerning favoritism based upon
quid pro quo harassment arises where a woman, under. duress,
accepts her supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances and thereby
wins promotion to a position for which another employee was
better qualified. Section 1604.11(g) of the EEOC Guidelines ad-
dresses this situation:
Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted be-
cause of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual ad-
vances or requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held
liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who
were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or
benefit.29
The EEOC describes two theories in support of such a claim:
(1) a disappointed female could claim that she was denied job
benefits as an "implicit quid pro quo" that had become a general
condition of employment; and (2) where an individual submits to
unwelcome sexual advances and is rewarded, both female and
male workers who are better qualified for the benefit in question
may advance a derivative claim on the basis of the unlawful sex-
based coercioi of the favored employee.30
With regard to isolated instances of favoritism toward a lover,
the EEOC takes the position that "Title VII does not prohibit
isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon consensual
romantic relationships.""'
According to the EEOC:
If favoritism based upon the granting of sexual favors is
widespread in a workplace, both male and female colleagues
who do not welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII regardless of whether any
objectionable conduct is directed at them and regardless of
whether those who were granted favorable treatment willingly
bestowed the sexual favors .
2
Both men and women who find this conduct to be offensive can
establish a violation if the conduct is severe enough to alter their
employment conditions and create an abusive working environ-
ment.,s
29 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1992).
30 Sexual Favoaitis, supra note 28, at 405:6817-21.
31 Id. § A.
32 Id § C.
33 Id.
19931
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C. Employer Liability
The EEOC Guidelines set forth the circumstances under
which the EEOC has determined that an employer will be held
liable for the acts of its employees. An employer is responsible for
the acts of its agents and supervisory employees "regardless of
whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even
forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employ-
er knew or should have known of their occurrence. "34 An em-
ployer is liable for sexual harassing conduct between fellow em-
ployees in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) "knows or should have known of the con-
duct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action. "3 An employer may be held responsible even
for the acts of non-employees with respect to sexual harassment of
employees in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) "knows or should have known of the con-
duct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective ac-
tion. " '
In Meritor, the Supreme Court expressly held that employers
are not always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisory personnel, but rather courts must look to agency prin-
ciples for guidance. 7 The Court acknowledged that such a rule
"is in some tension with the EEOC Guidelines, which hold an em-
ployer liable for the acts of its agents without regard to notice. "'
The Court, however, pointed out that the Guidelines require an
examination of the specific employment relationship and the
individual's job functions "in determining whether an individual
acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity."
In Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,'" the Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that in Meritor the Supreme Court determined that employ-
ers are no longer held strictly liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisory employees. 4' Brooms is particularly significant because
the court determined that a dual standard must be used when
34 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1992).
35 Id § 1604.11(d).
36 I. § 1604.11(e).
37 Mitor, 477 U.S. at 72.
38 Id. at 71.
39 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985)).
40 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
41 Id. at 420.
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SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION
evaluating a Title VII sexual harassment claim. A Title VII viola-
tion can be found only if the alleged misconduct "would adversely
affect the work performance and the well-being of both a reason-
able person and the particular plaintiff bringing the action."' In
King v. Board of Regents of University of Wsconsin System43 and
Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc.,44 the Seventh Circuit repeated that ha-
rassment must be judged from the view of a "reasonable person"
and the particular plaintiff. Thus, in the Seventh Circuit, a combi-
nation of subjective and objective standards must be employed to
determine the validity of a Title VII sexual harassment claim.'
Other circuits apply different tests. For example, the Third
Circuit has utilized a five-part test which includes the application
of objective and subjective factors.' The Eighth Circuit recently
endorsed a "reasonable woman" standard.47 Sixth Circuit cases
have produced conflicting results.4' The later view, as expressed
by the Sixth Circuit in, Yates v. Avco Corp.,49 is that in a case in-
volving a male supervisor's sexual harassment of a female subor-
dinate, "it seems only reasonable that the person standing in the
shoes of the employee should be 'the reasonable woman' since
the plaintiff in this type of case is required to be a member of a
protected class and is by definition female."'
Strong support for the "reasonable woman" standard can be
found in the Ninth Circuit. In Ellison v. Brady,"1 the court stated
that its adoption of the "reasonable woman" standard was based
primarily on the court's perception "that a sex-blind reasonable
person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systemat-
ically ignore the experiences of women."52 Further, "a gender-
conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to
42 Id. at 419.
43 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990).
44 937 F.2d 1264, 1271-72 (7th Cir. 1991).
45 Brooms, 881 F.2d at 419.
46 See Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1990); Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
47 Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 61 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-I (8th Cir.
1993).
48 Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cerL, denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987), with Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
49 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
50 Id. at 637. The court noted in dicta that, if the plaintiff were a male subordinate,
the "reasonable man" standard should be applied. Id. at 637 n.2.
51 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
52 Id. at 879.
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participate in the workplace on an equal footing with men. "53
The Ninth Circuit noted that if the plaintiff were male, the proper
perspective would be that of a reasonable man.
54
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1991
A. Title VI Expanded
Previously, under Title VII a prevailing plaintiff was entitled to
injunctive relief, including reinstatement, backpay, lost benefits,
attorneys' fees, certain litigation costs, and interest.5" Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, a prevailing plaintiff in a claim for inten-
tional discrimination under Title VII also may be entitled to: (1)
compensatory damages, including those for emotional pain, suffer-
ing, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life;
and (2) punitive damages if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
employer engaged in discriminatory conduct with malice or with
reckless indifference to the employee's federally protected
rights.' For each complaining party, the amount of compensato-
ry and punitive damages must not exceed:
-$50,000 for employers with more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees;"
-$100,000 for employers with more than 100 and fewer than
201 employees;
-$200,000 for employers with more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees; and
-$300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees.'
Significantly, the Act provides that a plaintiff who seeks com-
pensatory or punitive damages may demand a jury trial.59 A
plaintiff may also be granted expert fees as part of an attorney's
fee award.'
Under the Act, a defendant will be liable for declaratory and
certain injunctive relief and a plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs if
a plaintiff proves that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
53 Id
54 Id. at 879 n.11.
55 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988).
56 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1992).
57 The employer must have the stated number of employees in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding year. These caps may be removed in the
future.
58 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (Supp. 111 1992).
59 Id. § 1981a(c).
60 Id. § 1988(b).
1044 [Vol. 68:1037
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was a "motivating factor" for any employment decision, even
though other factors also motivated the employment decision, and
where the defendant demonstrates that it would have taken the
same action absent the impermissible motivation."' In those situa-
tions, however, a plaintiff is not allowed admission, reinstatement,
hiring, promotion, backpay, or compensatory or punitive damag-
es.
6 2
The potential under the Act for the receipt of greater mone-
tary rewards by plaintiffs and their attorneys undoubtedly will
cause an increase in the number of discrimination charges, and
lawsuits filed against employers. In particular, the Act now pro-
vides a monetary remedy for sexual harassment victims not depen-
dent on lost compensation. Previously, a sexually harassed employ-
ee could receive compensation only for economic losses under
Title VII. Since loss of pay often does not accompany harassment,
little or no monetary relief was provided for such claims. The
possibility of greater financial rewards for plaintiffs and their coun-
sel necessarily results in a substantial increase in employers' finan-
cial exposure and makes settlement more difficult.
Now that plaintiffs can recover for emotional distress, mental
anguish, pain and suffering, and may also recoup expert witness
fees, plaintiffs are expected increasingly to use experts at trial.
This will require employers seriously to consider utilizing experts
on their own behalf which will result in more expensive litigation.
It also makes trials more complex and more difficult for em-
ployers to win.
B. Retroactivity of the Act
One of the most difficult issues resulting from the passage of
the Act is its application to cases that were pending on, and con-
duct that occurred before, the date of its enactment. There is
much uncertainty in the Act and in the law in the area of retro-
activity. As this Article goes to press, seven circuit courts of appeals
have decided the issue.' The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Elev-
61 Id. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) (2)(B).
62 Id- § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
63 See Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d .470 (9th Cir. 1993); Baynes v. AT&T Technolo-
gies, 976 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1992); Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Landgr~f v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
No. 92-757, 92-938, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1760 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993); Luddington v. Indiana
Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363
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enth, and District of Columbia Circuits have determined that all
or part of the Act does not apply retroactively; the Ninth Circuit,
however, has held that the Act does apply retroactively. The Su-
preme Court has agreed. to resolve this issue.'
The Act contains no express direction concerning its retroac-
tivity. Thus, resolution of the retroactivity issue is a matter of statu-
tory construction. Two presumptions have evolved from case law:
(1) the presumption set out in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospi-
ta4' that statutes are to be applied prospectively only, absent a
contrary clear statutory mandate; and (2) the presumption set
forth in Bradly v. School Board of Richmond,' that the law in ef-
fect at the time of the decision should be applied, "unless doing
so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction
or legislative history to the contrary."6
7
Recently, in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,'
the Supreme Court, recognizing the inconsistency in these stan-
dards, found it unnecessary to resolve the conflict because Con-
gress had clearly expressed the non-retroactive effect of the statute
at issue.' Nonetheless, in his concurring opinion in Kaiser, Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that "absent specific indication to the con-
trary, the operation of nonpenal legislation is prospective only."7°
As stated above, Supreme Court resolution of the retroactivity
issue is forthcoming.
IV. LITIGATION OF A SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM
A. Agency Proceedings
Before an individual can file a complaint under the Act in
court, he or she must exhaust available administrative remedies. A
person who feels he or she has been a victim of sexual harassment
has various options. Requirements may vary from state to state. By
(5th Cir. 1992); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 9683 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.
1992); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); Vogel v. City of
Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992).
64 On February 22, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court granted petitions for review in
Landgraf, supra note 63, and Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.
1992), cert. granted No. 92-757, 92-938, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1760 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993).
65 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
66 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
67 Id. at 711; see also Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281-82
(1969).
68 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
69 Id. at 836.
70 Id. at 838 (footnotes omitted).
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way of example, the options available in Illinois will be discussed
here.
1. State Administrative Process
Illinois is considered a "deferral" state, that is, a state in which
the complainant must file with the state agency. In most deferral
states, such as Illinois, the state-EEOC work-sharing agreement
results in simultaneous filing with both agencies.
In Illinois, a charge must be filed with the Illinois Department
of Human Rights ("Department") within 180 days after the occur-
rence of an alleged violation.7 1 If the alleged civil rights violation
is continuing, the occurrence date may be any date subsequent to
the commencement of the alleged violation up to and including
the date on which it stopped.72 Where the Department conducts
the investigation, the Department's staff generally gathers informa-
tion from both parties and convenes a formal fact-finding confer-
ence.
73
Within the period which begins with the 301.st day after the
filing of a charge and ends with the 330th day after the filing of a
charge, the aggrieved party may file a complaint with the Illinois
Human Rights Commission ("Commission"), "if the Department
has not sooner filed a complaint or ordered that no complaint be
issued." 4 Thus, under those circumstances, the aggrieved indi-
vidual may file a complaint directly with the Commission during
this thirty-day window period.
I If the complainant does not file within the thirty-day window
period, the Department will continue its investigation and the
Director of the Department, or a duly authorized designee, ("Di-
rector") will ultimately issue a determination. If the Director con-
cludes that there is not substantial evidence of a civil rights viola-
tion or that the Department lacks jurisdiction, the charge will be
dismissed. The Department serves the parties written notice of the
dismissal and a copy of the investigative report. The notice states
71 ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 7A-102(A)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1992) (under the new
Illinois codification, this section can be found at 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1)).
72 IDHR R. PRAcr. & P. § 2520.310 (Rules of the Illinois Department of Htiman
Rights).
73 Id. §§ 2520.430-.440.
74 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 7A-102(g)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1992) (under the new
Illinois codification, this section can be found at 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(g)(2)). A period
longer than thirty days may be agreed upon by the parties. Id.
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the grounds for dismissal and advises the complainant that a re-
quest for review may be filed within thirty days of receipt of the
notice. On the other hand, if the Director concludes that there is
substantial evidence of a civil rights violation, the Department so
notifies the parties and advises them that conciliation efforts will
take place.
75
If conciliation fails to result in a settlement or dismissal of a
charge, the Department issues and files a complaint with the Com-
mission.' After discovery and hearing, an Administrative Law
Judge prepares a written recommended order and decision. Re-
gardless of whether exceptions to the recommended order and
decision are filed, a three-member panel of the Commission re-
views each recommended order and decision, together with the
record of proceedings, prior to issuing the Commission's final
order and decision.77 Within thirty days after service of the
Commission's Order and Decision, a party may petition for rehear-
ing before the entire Commission.7 After resolution of the re-
hearing issue, a party may obtain judicial review in the Illinois
Appellate Court.79
2. The EEOC Administrative Process
The EEOC follows a somewhat similar procedure. In a state
having a state or local law prohibiting sexual harassment, a com-
plainant actually has 300 days after the purported sexual harass-
ment occurred to file a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC's
investigation is sirhilar to that of the Illinois Department. After the
completion of its investigation, the EEOC will either make a find-
ing that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is
true or a finding that no such cause exists. If a reasonable cause
determination is made and conciliation efforts are unsuccessful,
the EEOC will ultimately issue a Notice of Right To Sue to the
complainant. The individual has ninety days from receipt of the
Notice to file a complaint in court." Significantly, even if the
75 IDHR R. PRACr. & P. § 2520.460.
76 I i § 2520.480.
77 IHRC R. PRAcr. & P. § 5300.910 (Rules of the Illinois Human Rights Commis-
sion).
78 Id § 5300.1150.
79 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 8-111(A)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1989) (under the new
Illinois codification, this section can be found at 775 ILCS 5/8-111(A)(1)).
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (Supp. III 1992).
81 Id. § 20ooe-5(f)(1).
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EEOC determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is true, the aggrieved individual is still entitled to
receive a Notice of Right To Sue and file a complaint in court.
Even before the completion of the EEOC investigation, an
aggrieved individual has the right to receive a Notice of Right To
Sue. If certain requirements are met, an individual may request a
Notice of Right To Sue once 180 days have expired since the
filing of the EEOC charge. The aggrieved person may file a civil
action in court within ninety days after receipt of the Notice. 2
With the passage of the Act, more complainants may well
choose the federal court as their litigation forum. Although the
limited discovery available under the state procedure may result in
the state administrative and court process being less costly for the
parties, complainants usually can initiate judicial proceedings much
more quickly by utilizing the EEOC process. They can then re-
quest and obtain a Notice of Right To Sue after the expiration of
180 days, and then immediately file a civil action in court. Because
the Act provides for, inter alia, the granting of compensatory and
punitive damages and a jury trial in an intentional discrimination
case, aggrieved parties are more likely to forego the state process,
quickly file in federal court, and try to obtain a large monetary
award from a jury.
B. Court Proceedings
While this Article does not purport to be an all-encompassing
discussion of how to litigate a sexual harassment case, it presents
some general observations and principles regarding the litigation
of such cases once they get to court. As noted, the Act has gener-
ally been held to be prospective.' Accordingly, as this Article
goes to press, there is a relative scarcity of cases which have been
decided under the Act.
As shown, under the Act a successful plaintiff claiming inten-
tional discrimination is entitled to compensatory and punitive
damages and a jury trial. It is no secret that jury trials are difficult
for employers to win. However, employer victories are not impossi-
ble.
The defendant or defendants are served with the sexual ha-'
rassment complaint soon after it is filed-in federal court. To sim-
82 Id.
83 See supra note 63.
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plify this discussion, a case against only one defendant will be
discussed here. Often, however, sexual harassment plaintiffs sue
not only the employer, but also others such as the alleged indi-
vidual harasser. That event gives rise to various issues. The court
must initially decide whether the complainant may sue the individ-
ual in his personal capacity or only in his corporate capacity."
Also, the joint defense of an employer and an individual defen-
dant presents issues such as potential conflicts of interest, attorney-
client privilege, and work product confidentiality. While these
matters will not be discussed in detail here, they are significant
and must be considered by defense counsel before undertaking
joint representation of the employer and the individual.
Upon receipt of the complaint, the defendant's counsel
should closely analyze it to see if it may be resolved with a motion
to dismiss. Since a plaintiff is now entitled to a jury trial with its
attendant costs and risks, a good faith dispositive or even limiting
motion to dismiss assumes added significance. A motion to dismiss
can be based on any one or more of numerous theories.' For
example, if the plaintiff has not filed a timely EEOC charge or a
timely complaint in court, a motion may seek dismissal because
the statutory limitations period has expired. If a defendant sup-
ports its motion to dismiss with documents which are not exclud-
ed by the court, "the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment."'
If the motion to dismiss is denied in whole or in part, and
possibly even while it is pending, the discovery process may be-
gin.17 Initially, a plaintiff usually depends on written discovery,
for example, interrogatories and document production requests, in
order to obtain the facts of the case and to learn the employer's
defenses. It is generally to the defendant's advantage to keep all
discovery, especially written discovery, to a minimum. The defen-
dant knows most of the facts. The defendant's principal need is to
learn the plaintiff's perception of the facts and damages and the
identity of alleged witnesses through the plaintiffs deposition. A
document request seeking all documents relevant to the plaintiff's
84 See Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 772 F. Supp. 407, 410-11 (N.D.
Ill. 1991) (determining that a claim against an individual in his personal capacity is not
actionable under Title VII).
85 See FED. R. Crv. P. 12.
86 1& at 12(b)(6).




liability and damage claims should accompany the notice of the
plaintiff's deposition.
Before the plaintiff's deposition, a defendant should request a
copy of the EEOC's investigation file under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act; obtain records of any physicians and therapists con-
sulted by the plaintiff; and conduct a thorough investigation. The
investigation should include interviews of the alleged harasser and
all employees who might have observed the plaintiff, the alleged,
harasser, or the harassment itself. Interviews should also be con-
ducted of any employees to whom the plaintiff spoke or com-
plained about the alleged harassment.
In a sexual harassment case, the plaintiff's deposition is an
extremely important part of the defense strategy. In addition to
learning the plaintiff's perception of the facts and damages and
the identity of purported witnesses, the defendant can use the
deposition: (1) to get to. know the plaintiff as a person and to
determine whether the plaintiff will appear to be credible to a
judge and jury; (2) to prepare for trial; (3) to discover any alleged
facts which might be inconsistent with the defenses intended to be
.raised by the employer; (4) as a basis for a summary judgment
motion; (5) to educate the plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel to
weaknesses in the plaintiff's case; (6) to apprise the plaintiff and
plaintiff's counsel of litigation's many unpleasant aspects, for ex-
ample, major commitment of time, emotion, and resources; and
(7) as a means to attack the plaintiffs credibility both during the
deposition itself and later during briefing on motions and at trial.
Prior to the passage of the Act, emotional distress generally
was an issue in only those cases where it was one of the plaintiff's
independent claims or where it somehow impacted other issues.
Now, because the Act allows for compensatory damages and plain-
tiffs can be expected to seek such relief in virtually every case,
inquiry at the plaintiff's deposition will concern all related matters,
for example, symptoms, psychological and medical treatment, med-
ication, therapists' and physicians' records, family and personal
relationships, traumatic experiences, job-related stress, and other
possible sources of harassment, tension, or stress.
Once the plaintiff puts his or her mental or physical condi-
tion in controversy, the court, upon a showing of good cause, may
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order the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination by a physi-
cian or a mental examination by a psychologist or physician.8
Traditionally, sexual harassment plaintiffs have used expert
testimony in some cases. Mental health experts, including psychi-
atrists, psychologists, or therapists, can help show the existence of
the plaintiff's emotional distress and its nexus with the alleged
sexual harassment.' The potential recovery of compensatory
damages under the Act will cause, if not necessitate, the plaintiffs
use of expert testimony in virtually every. case where such relief is
sought. To the extent permitted under applicable rules, the defen-
dant should request the plaintiff to identify any experts early in
the litigation process. If the plaintiff delays producing this infor-
mation, the employer should aggressively pursue obtaining it as
quickly as possible by appropriate means.
Once the plaintiff's experts are identified, again to the extent
permitted under applicable rules, the defendant should obtain,
through discovery, each expert's report and any underlying doc-
uments. This report should disclose the expert's theory and
methodology and, in fact, the express and implied bases for the
expert's conclusions. The defendant should also obtain all other
written materials which relate in any way to the expert's relation-
ship with the plaintiff.
Only after the defendant is confident that it possesses all the
expert's reports and all written material generated by the expert-
plaintiff relationship to which the defendant is entitled, and after
it is clear that a trial is probable, should the expert's deposition
be taken by the defendant. Again, applicable rules will govern.
The deposition should be taken as close to trial as feasible so that
the defendant can learn' the most recent information regarding
the plaintiff's condition.
On the other hand, the plaintiff will also want to conduct
discovery regarding any experts retained by the defendant. While
the defendant should conduct a preliminary search for potential
experts early in the litigation, in many cases, if at all possible, the
defendant should postpone actually hiring an expert until after
the deposition of the plaintiff's expert. Admittedly, this means that
a good deal of last minute preparation for trial may take place.
Nonetheless, any final decision regarding whether the defendant
88 FED. R. Civ. P. 35.




should hire an expert at all, and, if so, the identity of the
defendant's expert, generally is more appropriately made after the
defendant has completed its discovery of the plaintiff's experts. It
is at this point that the defendant will have a clear understanding
of the scope and contents of the analysis of the plaintiff's experts.
Only then can the defendant make a reasoned decision as to
whether.an expert is needed for the defendant's case.
A defendant usually has a need to take few, if any, deposi-
tions other than those of the plaintiff and any experts. However, if
the alleged sexual harasser has left the company and moved be-
yond the subpoena power of the court, the employer may want to
take his or her deposition in order to preserve such testimony in
the event the individual-assumedly a necessary part of the
defendant's defense-will not be available at trial.
On the other hand, a plaintiff normally will take several depo-
sitions. A plaintiff has the same interest as a defendant in taking
the depositions of any needed witnesses who are beyond the sub-
poena power of the court. In addition, the plaintiff will undoubt-
edly want to take the depositions of any relevant company
decisionmakers and possibly some of the plaintiff's supervisors,
managers, and co-workers.
Once discovery, or a least non-expert discovery, is closed, if
the facts so warrant and settlement is not feasible at that juncture
in the proceedings, the defendant should file a summary judgment
motion. Because the alternative is a costly and risky jury trial, the
defendant should try to dispose of all, or at least part, of the case
summarily.
Whether courts in cases brought under the Act will, be more
reluctant or more inclined to grant summary judgment to employ-
ers remains'to be seen. Because plaintiffs have a right to a jury
trial and because the law in general is currently more favorable to
plaintiffs, courts might be more reluctant to grant dispositive mo-
tions. On the other hand, the expense in time and resources of
jury trials and the likelihood of more frivolous lawsuits precipi-
tated by the plaintiff's hope of obtaining a windfall from a sympa-
thetic jury may cause judges to examine closely summary judgment
motions. Courts could then readily dispose of those cases in which
a trial would be a waste of the resources of the court, the liti-
gants, and the jury.
If the defendant's summary judgment motion fails, two op-
tions remain: settlement or jury trial. Both parties should seriously
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explore settlement possibilities at this time. Obviously, if a settle-
ment is not reached, the case must go to the jury.
Clearly, at a trial most jurors will identify with the plaintiff;
thus, the employer should take only strong cases to the jury. A
strong case is one in which there is essentially no evidence of
discrimination or harassment and one in which the employer
acted fairly and reasonably. Although, from a legal perspective, the
fairness and reasonableness of an employer's conduct frequently
should play a minor, if any, role, jurors normally place a signifi-
cant amount of weight on whether the employer did what was
"fair."
For example, where a plaintiff rests her sexual harassment
claim on a quid pro quo theory claiming that she was not pro-
moted because she refused her supervisor's sexual advances, the
jurors will undoubtedly use a "fairness" standard in analyzing the
employer's probable defense that she was not qualified for the
promotion. Similarly, in assessing a hostile environment claim, the
jurors will undoubtedly seek to determine whether the employer
treated the plaintiff "fairly" given all of the circumstances.
Because many sexual harassment cases which survive summary
judgment are simply credibility conflicts between the plaintiff and
the alleged harasser, the ultimate question for the jury is to de-
cide who is to be believed-who presents the more credible story.
Giving that question to a group of basically unknown individuals
whose sympathies are undoubtedly with the employee is very risky
for the employer. At trial, obviously each party will attempt to
impeach the other party's witnesses and render their stories in-
credible.
While each party has various matters to consider at trial, a few
issues are very important. For example, pursuant to the EEOC
Guidelines, an employer should have a policy to prevent sexual
harassment:
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual
harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the
subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how
to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and developing
methods to sensitize all concerned.90
90 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1992).
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An employer's sexual harassment policy plays a significant role in
the defense of any sexual harassment case. A showing by the em-
ployer that it has a written sexual harassment policy, a complaint
procedure for sexual harassment victims, training and education
programs regarding sexual harassment concerns, a policy of thor-
oughly investigating every complaint, and a practice of taking
prompt corrective action might appear to the jury to be incon-
sistent with a finding that the employer engaged in sexual harass-
ment. Similarly, if the plaintiff failed to utilize the complaint pro-
cedure, a finding that no sexual harassment actually occurred
might result.
The complainant's conduct also may be relevant. In Meitot,
the Supreme Court determined that the complainant's dress and
speech might be relevant to the issue of "unwelcomeness."9' 1 If a
plaintiff who engages in sexually explicit conduct complains of
others' vulgar comments and conduct, the sexual advances that
follow may not be viewed as "unwelcome."
As mentioned above, the plaintiff will undoubtedly present
expert testimony at trial. Plaintiffs are expected increasingly to uti-
lize the services of mental health experts, sociological experts, and
employment professionals. From the employer's perspective, the
plaintiff's use of sociological experts and employment professionals
has no real value and serves only to prejudice the jury against the"
employer. A sociological expert may testify as to the existence of a
hostile environment.' Employment professionals, such as human
resource specialists, may provide expert testimony on appropriate
sexual harassment policies. Neither sociological experts nor em-
ployment professionals appear to have the experience or educa-
tion which provides the specialized knowledge necessary to qualify
them as experts. If possible, defendants should preclude such
expert testimony at trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment litigation is expected to increase as a result
of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Cases will be
brought by plaintiffs who have been sexually harassed and by
plaintiffs who have not been sexually harassed. Nonetheless, sexual
91 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
92 See g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
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harassment cases brought under the Act will be more costly and
more difficult for employers to win. Employers' financial exposure
will increase dramatically. Settlement will be more difficult because
of the greater amount of potential monetary recovery by plaintiffs.
The implementation and execution of a strong and effective sexu-
al harassment policy are necessities for the employer. Obviously,
from both the employer's and the employee's viewpoint, sexual
harassment should be eliminated. Further, from the employer's
perspective, it is far easier and less costly to prevent sexual harass-
ment than to litigate it. Unfortunately, however, even the preven-
tion of sexual harassment is not likely to eliminate its litigation.
